

# *Persons as the Cause of Their Own Action: Karol Wojtyła on Efficacy*

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**ABSTRACT.** In contemporary philosophy, the discussion regarding causation is very advanced. In this article I will limit my analyses to the kind of causation connected with the human being. Moreover, I plan to concentrate on a very select set of proposals. Basically, I intend to present Karol Wojtyła's understanding of efficacy and undertake a critical assessment thereof. In order to do so, similar proposals by Max Scheler and Immanuel Kant – with whom Wojtyła was in critical dialogue – will be outlined. Scheler and Kant represent certain models of human causation that are typical of continental philosophy, as well as ethics and ethical action. In his later works, Wojtyła also considered this topic in a wider context when he was sketching a picture of the acting person. For this reason, we will also focus on this extended version of personal causality. At the centre of interest is the dilemma: how do human beings become the cause of their own actions and what consequences stem from this. Karol Wojtyła treats the human being as a person. Human causation is thus a personal causation. Because of his personalistic approach, causation is turned into something more, namely into efficacy. This present contribution is an attempt at grasping all the complexities of the latter in a dialectical comparison with the phenomenological, Kantian, and Thomistic approaches.

**KEYWORDS.** The person, causality-efficacy, Karol Wojtyła, personalism

## I. CAUSATION IN THE ETHICAL THINKING OF SCHELER AND KANT

**I**n the early stages of his philosophizing, Karol Wojtyła engaged in a study of the ethical thought of Max Scheler as well as Immanuel Kant. He was interested in how these great philosophers understand morality and the moral act. The theory of personalistic ethics, formulated later by the Polish thinker, comprises many elements of phenomenological and

Kantian thought. Nevertheless, this positive outcome was not a result of a peaceful acceptance of all the tenets of their philosophy, but stemmed rather from a dialectical exchange of ideas. In other words, Wojtyła's analyses led him first to a critical discussion with Scheler and Kant because, while appreciating the contribution these figures had made to ethical thought, the philosopher from Krakow encountered many elements with which he could not agree.<sup>1</sup> One of these was their inadequate understanding of the moment of efficacy.

Efficacy, as such, is a part of anthropological investigation. Determining the role it plays and how strong it is sheds some essential light on the ontology of the human being. Thus a clear-cut concept of this category brings with it vital assistance in emphasizing the character of human persons, particularly in that they are beings who are a primary cause of their own actions and undertakings. But this anthropological understanding is somehow hidden in ethical considerations. Following Wojtyła's analyses, this thinking should be brought to the fore and assessed in a critical manner. This line of investigation would seem to be justified by the assumption that any ethical project has an anthropological project as its background. This is true not only with respect to Wojtyła's philosophical activity but also to that of Scheler and Kant.<sup>2</sup>

Let us start with Scheler's thinking. If we intend to investigate personal efficacy, the first thing that must be determined is his concept of the person. Scheler rejects a metaphysical understanding of the person claiming that "[...] the person must *never* be considered a thing or a *substance*" (1973, 371; italics original).<sup>3</sup> At the same time, he states his own definition of the term: "[...] the person is, rather, the immediately coexperienced unity of experiencing"; and he stresses that "[...] the person is not a merely thought thing behind and outside what is immediately experienced" (1973, 371). The person then lives in his or her immediate lived experience and it is only in this actuality, one can maintain, that he or she exists. Such a thesis can be interpreted in two ways. First, that the person is a set of ongoing acts, or a kind of collection of personal acts. Later in

his analyses, however, Scheler questions and even rejects such an interpretation.<sup>4</sup> Second, the person is a kind of entity who lives in and through his or her acts alone. The philosopher points to the person as a subject enduring in his or her existence (maybe as a kind of spirit?)<sup>5</sup>, but there is no certainty as to his or her final character.<sup>6</sup>

According to Scheler, human being is attuned to values that are called material values. They are discovered through emotions, which the German philosopher names ‘intentional feelings’. Emotions are experienced at all levels of human existence (i.e. on the varying levels of one’s sensibility), but on a basic level they are connected with the senses and only exist as an emotional state. At other levels of human existence, however, emotions are directed to specific objects, namely higher material values, and hence they become intentional feelings. Generally, feelings have priority in the process of cognition: first, we as human beings feel value and only later do we acquire an insight into the structure of value.

What is important in Scheler’s conception of ethics is that the persons are immersed in material values, experience them and are even a value in themselves, but they are not a starting point for them (Wojtyła 1991, 28). At the beginning, values are given to persons in experience and only in this way do they may become goals. These goals are made conscious in mental representations. As Wojtyła points out – commenting on Scheler’s project – in this moment we can also talk about an appearance of the willingness to follow these values within the person (1986, 28). Here the question to be posed is whether the attempt to realize a given value stems principally from the value itself or from a human subject. The German philosopher did not give a clear answer to this question but – as Wojtyła observes – we can conclude from Scheler’s entire system of thinking that the former is true, namely that the person acquires the inspiration and energy to follow a value from experiencing the value itself (1986, 28-29). Thus, from a phenomenological point of view, the emphasis is placed on values and their experience, but not on the person as a doer of various activities. As Wojtyła puts it, “[...] the person remains only

a subject of experience, a passive subject, but is not a cause of the acts, he does not act” (1986, 33).

The objection that Wojtyła directs toward Scheler’s ethical and anthropological thinking is this: the person is an entity who lives in the world of values, but has a limited influence on them. Persons experience values, but do not experience themselves as a cause of these values. Acts of awareness and the will accompany acts of value experience, but not as primary causes. It looks as if values are the factors that prompt and stimulate persons to act, but not persons themselves. What then is the person’s role in the entire process? Of course, he or she is not an utterly passive and inert reality. Besides emotional states and intentional feelings taking place within, the person is conscious of what is going on and through his or her will he or she gives a kind of consent. Thus he or she participates in the entire process of causation. But as we mentioned, activities of consciousness and the will are secondary and the accent is put on the unfolding and development of the value in its dynamics.<sup>7</sup>

Wojtyła’s discussion with Immanuel Kant’s approach to efficacy must be preceded by a question concerning the understanding of the human being. The German philosopher assumes that the human being lives in both a phenomenal and noumenal world. In the former, deterministic laws of nature obtain and natural human inclinations play important roles. In the latter, however, there is a place for the unfolding of such human powers as reason and free will. These two dimensions are clearly illustrated when Kant describes various ‘predispositions’ that constitute any human being, namely animality, humanity and personality (Kant 1960, b. I, § 1; see also Wood 2008, 88). Animality contains the capacities for survival for both the individual and the species, having a character of instinctual tendency. It thus determines this aspect of human existence, which is under natural influences. Humanity is connected with the capacity to set ends and find means to attain them. It also contains a tendency to rational self-love, leading us to form the concept of our own happiness and to follow it. Personality is strictly connected with our capacity to

legislate moral law for ourselves, and then to impose it and obey it. Humanity understood as the ability to set ends according to reason is the manifestation of freedom, so it is similar to personality, and together they make up – as Scheler put it – “Kant’s *homo noumenon*” (1973, 380).

Wojtyła comments on Kant’s distinction and introduces his own proposal: ‘lower man’ (*homo phaenomenon*) and ‘higher man’ (*homo noumenon*) (1986, 42). Only the ‘higher man’ is a subject of freedom, reason and morality. The main role is played here by reason, which imposes an imperative on the will according to an aprioric practical form, namely moral law. Proposing such a solution, Kant wanted to exclude all other factors as premises of moral actions. He rejected various experiences and other natural states as sources of morality and stressed that only reason has an authority to dictate actions constituting moral conduct. Thus almost all experiences, including feelings of values, are excluded as inappropriate causes of moral actions (with an exception of reverence for moral law). In commenting on Kant’s position – in a way typical of Scheler – Wojtyła points to a moral act as an undertaking constituted primarily by a clear personal moment, but not by a material content (1986, 48).

What is this personal moment all about for Kant? And why is it contrasted with a material content of any sort? The former consists in the activity of reason that recognizes moral law and imposes it on the will. In this way, the will becomes the only causal power prompting a subject to act, at least *prima facie*. This means, of course, that the subject, acting on moral law, must struggle with all the factors and circumstances making up the ‘phenomenal man’, including emotions, bodily tendencies, and external stimuli. But because the subject possesses a free will, he or she can act on the sole imperatives coming from reason. In such a way, moral action reveals that it is a proper domain of the person (Wojtyła 1986, 46). Factors that can be characterized by material content such as material values cannot have any share in moral action, even an indirect one. They belong to a phenomenal sphere, whereas morality takes place only within the noumenal. This means that if the will tends to fulfil an obligation

dictated by reason, but any emotion or other non-rational factor participates in it, such conduct cannot be considered as morality, although it lives up to a standard of legality (Kant 1996, chapter 3). Morality is a pure derivative of reason.

Wojtyła appreciates the role of the will in Kant's conception of morality. In this way, morality gains a more subjective character, that is, the subject is presented as the cause of his or her moral actions. Especially reason and the will manifest the subject in moral causation, namely in efficacy. But Wojtyła is not uncritical toward this conception. He points to at least two doubtful moments. First, he observes that Kant's moral law is formal and has no clear-cut content.<sup>8</sup> Second, Wojtyła concentrates on the relationship between reason and the will, and points to an asymmetry between them. The former plays the main role, whereas the latter is secondary and is kept in subjection. It leads to a situation – as Wojtyła observes – that reason is a power that dominates the will, and the latter becomes a passive or semi-passive element compared to the former.<sup>9</sup> The Polish thinker draws a surprising conclusion from this: losing a dynamic character, the will ceases to be a cause of moral action and constitutes “a passive element in the structure of humanness” (1986, 65).

## II. PERSONAL CAUSATION IN ETHICS: A CRITICAL LOOK

While Wojtyła is involved in a philosophical dialogue with Kant and Scheler, he also puts forth his own conception concerning human efficacy. In the course of his dialogue, he accepts some ideas and rejects others. As we have seen, Wojtyła appreciates the category of value promoted by Max Scheler, but is disappointed by the secondary role of human efficacy in the course of the manifestation and unfolding of values. Also, he accepts Kant's emphasis on the role of reason and the will, but cannot agree with the interpretation of these powers and the relationship between them. Thus, he is aware that a dominant role of value and a one-sided understanding of reason and the will cannot adequately explain personal agency, especially in

the moral realm. Values are important in human efficacy, but more important is the subject who discovers and realizes them. Also, reason, equipped with formal imperatives, influencing a passive will, and tending against all natural inclinations, does not reflect the whole truth about the personal origins of action. It would be risky to claim that an outcome of personal efficacy, namely the moral act, is a result of a conflict taking place within an agent (between reason and natural inclinations). Finally, and this is important for Wojtyła, value and imperative do not exclude each other, as follows from Scheler and Kant, taken separately.

Values are essential in a person's action: they stimulate the will from the material side. But this stimulation, given in their experience, is not a necessity, but a premise for the acting person.<sup>10</sup> In other words, it does not compel the person to carry out an act.<sup>11</sup> It is indeed the person who acts and his or her dominant role is here indispensable. Wojtyła introduces here the concept of the “efficacious self-determination of the personal ‘I’” (1986, 60). It refers to both objective and material elements as well as subjective and personal elements. Objective and material elements, as we observed, include values that are basically not projections of the subject, but are discovered by the subject (hence, the person acts according to a given value). The latter encompasses such personal powers as reason and the will. This subjective side is essential because some values can be discovered and incarnated (Wojtyła uses the expression ‘give birth to values’) only due to an active engagement of the person. As an example, Wojtyła points to the value of the person him or herself; in other words, an active engagement in some values gives birth to the value of the person him or herself (1986, 37). The will – in contrast to Kant – is understood differently here. Following the analyses of Thomas Aquinas, this power is not considered passive, but as containing something essential for personal efficacy. It is a kind of inner dynamics called *motio* and understood as a tendency to act.<sup>12</sup>

Wojtyła – spelling out Aquinas's moral thinking – attempts to show how the dynamic will cooperates with reason. The latter generates a kind

of order directed to the will (*imperium*). The will, in turn, brings about a kind of move (*motio*). Nevertheless, a relationship between the one and the other is slightly complex. The Polish thinker points out that the order of reason brings about the move of the will because it is already inserted in the act of the will and the latter is present in the former. This means that the act of the will has a rational character and what is typical for the will (*motio*) is somehow present in the act of the reason (1986, 65). Thus the will must contain ‘grains’ of rationality (hence a rational will) and the reason must have a kind of dynamic in itself. In the whole structure of the person it is more understandable: reason is not an extra-worldly reality detached from other spheres of human existence (as seems to be the case in Kant); the will, in turn, is not a blind power acting upon random impulses and whims, but is basically disposed to be informed by the highest faculty of the person, that is, by reason.

### III. ACTING PERSON AND EFFICACY

In his later works, Wojtyła turned to personal efficacy in a wider context, namely in reference to the acting person. In his view, the human being undertakes various actions (or undergoes various processes). Not all of these actions seem to have a moral character<sup>13</sup>, but nevertheless they almost always reveal that the human being exists as a special entity. The person is thus shown as a result of his or her acts and undertakings. This idea is a primary thread in Wojtyła’s anthropological reflection.

He introduces the distinction between acts and happenings. Different sorts of causation can be ascribed to them. Acts have characteristics of the pursuits initiated by the person in strict relation to reason and the will. They encompass moral actions when the subject operates strictly on a horizon of moral values or moral goods. But they also take place when an action seems to be morally neutral, while equally engaging the subject’s intellect and will. In Wojtyła’s personalism, however, any action is in a certain relation to the person, as will be demonstrated below. Hence all

acts should be classified as undertakings promoting the good of the person or weakening that good.<sup>14</sup>

Furthermore, acts can make an objective change (i.e. without, but also a change within the subject itself). As Wojtyła claims,

[I]n turning toward a variety of ends, objects, I cannot help but also in my conscious activity turn toward myself as an end, for I cannot relate to different objects of activity and choose different values without thereby determining myself (thus becoming the primary object for myself as a subject) and my own value (1993b, 230).

Hence, we can distinguish two versions of efficacy: efficacy to-the-object and efficacy to-the-subject. The former has a transitive character, whereas the latter has an intransitive one. This distinction reflects the other discrimination elaborated in Thomistic thought between transitive and immanent actions.

Let us turn to a kind of efficacy resulting in self-determination (to-the-subject). Wojtyła devotes some attention to this topic. He is aware that no undertaking has a solely objective character. As he mentioned in the above quotation, any involvement of the person in different external objects, processes, and values is strictly connected with self-determination. The person as a whole is engaged in his or her activities and any action leaves a mark on the doer and even transforms him or her. The person carrying out any act constitutes him or herself and reveals him or herself as a special kind of entity. We can then point to two profiles where this takes place: a formal profile and a material one. The formal profile concerns every human being in a general way. Here we can say that every human being is a person. The material profile is associated with diversity within this sameness (conveyed by the formal profile). Hence, although everyone is a person, every person is different in their personhood. Self-determination, which is a tool in this respect, is strictly connected with self-possession and self-governance. When self-determination is disclosed, self-possession and self-governance are also revealed (Wojtyła 1993b, 230-231).<sup>15</sup>

Happenings or ‘what happens in me’ contain a different kind of causation. There is no direct link between them and reason and the will. The person experiences these happenings, but basically has no influence on them. They are parts of bodily or psychological dynamics and that is why they seem to be independent of personal efficacy. Of course, *post factum*, the subject can think about them and even enquire about their sources. In this way, a slight mental control over them can be acquired. Happenings, in contrast to acts, seem to come from the sub-personal sphere of existence. But Wojtyła is far from relegating them to such a region. He attempts to show that happenings cannot be excluded from a personal realm.

Wojtyła employs a concept of the metaphysical subject, *suppositum*, in order to prove an integral belonging of happenings and their inner dynamics to the person. He writes,

[O]n the ground of *suppositum* difference and opposition between someone’s acts and happenings [...] yield because of the obvious unity and identity of the human being. It is he who acts. And when something happens in him, he – a personal ‘somebody’ – does not act, but nevertheless all dynamism of happenings is equally his property as well as the dynamism of acts. He – a personal ‘somebody’ – remains at the beginning of the happenings taking place in him as well as at the beginning of acts which he carries out as a perpetrator (1994, 128).

In the light of this concept of the metaphysical subject, both spheres of the human being, namely a strictly personal self and a bodily-psychoic realm, form personhood. Wojtyła is convinced that the person is at the beginning of acts as well as happenings. Such a thesis is troublesome and needs further clarification.

Wojtyła is aware that in the experience of one’s own self, ‘I’ is the climax of all human experiences. The self is shown forth fully in act and only then is his or her efficacy fully manifested. When a happening takes place, however, he or she is not a doer or perpetrator of it, but – as Wojtyła puts it – “[...] experiences inner identity between the happening and the self, and at the same time experiences a dependence of the happening exclusively on

this self” (1994, 129). The happening is a property of the subject and the philosopher points to a basic human experience strengthening this relationship. Thus we have a twofold way of proving that both acts and happenings belong to the person, and that personal causation encompasses a strictly personal efficacy and sub-personal dynamics: thinking underpinned by the concept of *suppositum* and thinking in the light of the experience of integrity and wholeness of the human being.

#### IV. A FINAL LOOK AT EFFICACY

In Karol Wojtyła’s works we can find various factors that are candidates for causes of actions. Thus far we have singled out moral values, reason, the will, and natural bodily and psychic states and processes. The philosopher, however, is unwilling to credit any single factor with the full power to initiate a really human action. In his view, they are not independent subjects acting on their own; they belong to the human subject who – at the same time – is an owner of them all, and uses them (actively or passively) as his or her tools. Thus we cannot properly understand human causation without the concept of the subject as a non-determined (although conditioned by various elements) originator of action. All in all, Wojtylian efficacy is the efficacy of the person and not a causation of random forces or elements working as a consequence of something else, e.g. as is the case within an unspecified chain of events (presupposed in a naturalistic stance). What is important to notice here is that the person uses these factors and their tendencies, but basically imposes his or her own goals and hence directions of actions. It means that the person can occasionally yield to this or that natural or other tendency, which does not live up to his or her full status (the measure of who he or she is) but he or she is indeed in possession of the ability to integrate them on a higher level, that is, in the light of higher aims.

Wojtyła’s approach to personal causation is complex and depends on a project he tries to implement. As an ethicist, he emphasizes a strictly

personal efficacy because only as such does it have a bearing on a moral assessment of action. Thus, the person is at the centre of attention and values, reason, and other human powers are only treated secondarily here. This perception is slightly changed once Wojtyła employs a wider picture of the human person. He or she still remains a moral subject but another kind of causality appears. This causality is far from a strictly personal one, but it is not alien or external to the person altogether. Although caused by bodily and psychic dynamics, and in this way originating outside reason and the will, this sort of causality is considered an integral part of the personal causality. Adhering to such a view, Wojtyła widens the range of factors participating in a personal efficacy.

Nevertheless, the person is the same subject in all his or her undertakings, be they moral or extra-moral.<sup>16</sup> His or her efficacy, including bodily and psychic dynamics, reveals his or her complexity, but proves at the same time that he or she is the real originator of his or her manifold actions. As mentioned earlier, the Polish philosopher explains this complexity by employing the concept of the metaphysical subject (*suppositum*) and by pointing to a genuine human experience. It seems that we need further explanation supporting this approach and the foundations thereof are already given in Wojtyła's philosophizing.

Wojtyła does not propose that the human being should be segmented. He never adheres to a thesis that the human being is only a bodily creature or a spiritual self, nor merely a moral being or a rational creature. Following Aristotle, Wojtyła still perceives the human being as an *animal rationale*. Interestingly, this is demonstrated when he distinguishes two approaches to the human being: a cosmological and a personal. And then he subscribes to a thesis that – although they differ – they are not opposed but, in fact, complement each other (1993a, 211). For our analyses this means that personal efficacy cannot be limited to a strictly personal sphere: it must encompass and integrate into itself the animal dynamics of human being. On closer inspection, some elements can be singled out that may be at odds with tendencies of the personal

life, namely to the truth and to the good. But we can also point to many other elements of the same kind that cooperate with higher personal goals. Even if a bodily causation works through various instincts, we cannot deny that they are, in a sense, rational, or at least that a kind of rationality – with all its limitations – is somehow inscribed in them. Thus following these instinctual tendencies, the person partly carries out his or her nature as an *animal rationale*.<sup>17</sup>

Of course, these various versions of efficacy, taken together, correcting each other, and in a sense, cooperating with one another, lead – in Wojtyła’s conviction – to an integral fulfilment of the human person. Wojtyła has a broad understanding of the notion of fulfilment. Thus, for him it is not limited to the rational realm or only to the moral realm, let alone to that of the body. Of course, its moral aspect plays a special and dominant role, but not at the expense of others. It is not similar to Kant’s theory where being moral means following reason and rejecting emotions or other feelings. Neither is it the morality equivalent of following emotions primarily, as in Scheler’s project. In his *Lublin Lectures*, the Polish philosopher openly declares that, “[...] if human being is oriented toward *bonum honestum*, *eo ipso* integration of the human entity is realized” (1986, 287). This means that efficacy, which is revealed in moral actions, opens up and provides a place for other kinds of efficacy, and finally leads to their integration for the sake of the integral good of the person. Thus, although there are various faces to human efficacy, when integrated they can play an indispensable role in existence and development of the person.

The concept of personal efficacy promoted by Karol Wojtyła also conveys several other points. First, a complex understanding of the subject emerges from this thinking. It begins with a sort of common sense approach to human being, that is, this thinking grasps each being in its basic phenomena, but later tries to account for them separately. Thus, the subject is a bodily creature, one among other living entities and, at the same time, manifests something more, namely its rational nature, the ability to experience values and finally an ability to perform acts of the will. Moreover,

human beings are aware of their own ability to perform these acts of the will and experience themselves as existing and acting subjects. Such complex phenomena demand various tools in order to carry out their adequate interpretation. These tools are taken from reservoirs of both the realist and idealist philosophies, especially from a classical Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics, and from twentieth century phenomenology. Employing these tools, Wojtyła points out that the subject is multidimensional, but at the same time remains an integrated and dynamic entity, namely a person. The latter has a stronger metaphysical structure than the person presupposed by Scheler, and Wojtyła is more on the realist side in his comprehension than Kant with his approach to the person. In general, Wojtyła offers an understanding of human being that is not consonant with mainstream notions,<sup>18</sup> although it is rooted in a tradition of Western philosophy. Second, Wojtyła's analysis of efficacy starts from ethics and finds its completion in ethical thinking. But his understanding of ethics has a vital connection with the other way of investigating human being, namely with philosophical anthropology. From this follows the third point, that the subject's efficacy is not a one-dimensional causation but an intentional coordination of various forces and powers, be they natural or non-natural.<sup>19</sup> Thus, finally, we stand before a project that is between a traditional divide (realist *versus* idealist philosophy), and it is therefore prone to criticism from both sides. At the same time, this type of conception provokes a philosophical discussion and that is what makes it so promising.

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## NOTES

1. Wojtyła's dealings with Scheler and Kant have a specific character. I assume that one might disagree with the way Wojtyła comments on their ideas and with the conclusions he draws. Nevertheless, Wojtyła's analyses are well-grounded and seem credible.

2. These philosophers assume various understandings of a person. Wojtyła steers between the Aristotelian and Thomistic approach, and the post-Cartesian comprehension of the person (see Wojtyła 1981, 21ff). The following analyses will reveal further details of this approach.

3. In his thought, there is a dualistic comprehension of the human being. On the one hand, the human being is a person who is the centre of our attention; on the other, the human being is a living thing subject to various natural processes.

4. The German philosopher points out that “[...] the conclusion that the person must be only an ‘interconnective complex’ of acts is quite false” (Scheler 1973, 385).

5. Scheler claims the following: “[...] the *whole person* is contained in *every* fully concrete act, and the whole person ‘*varies*’ in and through every act – without being exhausted in his being in any of these acts, and without ‘changing’ like a thing in time” (1973, 385).

6. One of the commentators claims that the German philosopher is unclear on this issue. The latter uses terminology that does not allow us to reach a clear-cut conclusion. One thing seems sure: Scheler wants to avoid two extremities – on the one hand he rejects a thesis that the person is a substance; on the other, he denies that he or she is a constellations of acts (see Dupuy 1959, 341-342).

7. For instance, Wojtyła points out that Scheler’s act of the will is “an epiphenomenon of emotional life” (1986, 37). If this is true, then the act of the will is not only secondary, but also has no substantial casual power over emotions.

8. If any, such content is established by a rule of universalization. However, there is no content of morality at the starting point, that is, something that is given to the reason and the will to respect at the very beginning of their activity.

9. In fact, in Scheler’s position the will is also treated secondarily. Thus Scheler’s approach to the will resembles that of Kant’s (see Kupczak 2000, 37-38).

10. As Adrian Reimers puts it, “[...] for the acting person intends not only to have certain experiences (indeed, he may not directly intend the experiences at all) but to set himself in motion to attain some end” (2011, 88-89).

11. Of course, we can still distinguish two approaches of the subject to values: subjective and objective. The former amounts to the person’s commitments to values. It is an effect of interiorizing these values. The latter, in turn, is associated with a process of recognizing values by the subject. But the subjective mode of dealing with values does not replace the subject him or herself. It can enrich them, strengthen them axiologically, but it cannot radically change their nature as doers and perpetrators.

12. In a number of places, Wojtyła makes a reference to Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on the will. The concept of *motio* is twofold and is similar to two dimensions of the will described by the psychology of the will: its actual-dynamic and its motive. The former is associated with a spontaneous move of the will due to its directedness to any kind of good. The latter is connected with a move to a concrete good, which is presented to it by the intellect (see Kupczak 2000, 36-37).

13. Some acts performed by the person engage his or her reason and will but seem to be neutral, at least *prima facie*. For example, it may be difficult to say, at first glance, why study and acquiring knowledge is a moral action.

14. Thus, in Wojtyła’s project there are no neutral acts. All acts are either morally good or evil. If the person is a value, then any act that strengthens or weakens him or her has a moral character.

15. Generally, personal efficacy – as Wojtyła presents it – “[...] brings to light the subjectivity proper to the person” (1993b, 230). Although, it is an important part of the philosopher’s project, I am not going to delve much further into this aspect. My intention is – in the present article – to concentrate on various types of personal causations and show how they fit together into a picture of the acting person.

16. Being a real originator of various actions does not mean that the person is equally responsible for them. Moral accountability for acts differs from moral accountability for happenings. It stems from the fact that the person – with his or her higher powers and faculties – is differently involved in one than in the other. However, this discrepancy does not change an anthropological thesis that the person is ‘at the beginnings’ of all his or her actions and – using the terminology of Richard Sorabji – he or she should be considered ‘the single owner’ of those actions (see Sorabji 2006, 260).

17. The human being always remains a ‘frontier being’ as Norris Clarke puts it (1996, 183-199) or as presented by James Reichmann, “[...] a citizen of two worlds, the biological and the meta-biological” (2000, 80-81).

18. Jonardon Ganeri points to three dominant depictions of human being in contemporary philosophy. They include “[...] the pictures that we are immaterial souls associated with but separable from our animal bodies; the picture that we are nothing but especially complex networks of neuronal circuits; and the picture that we are simply casual flows of consciousness” (2012, 1).

19. Wojtyła is far from being a reductionist as far as the person, his or her will and causation are concerned. In this sense, he is prone to criticism from a dominant naturalistic approach. Nevertheless, there are other contemporary philosophers who prove that naturalism is not our unavoidable destiny (see, for example, O’Connor 2000).